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PERSONAL LIABLLHIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS. By MORTIMER FEUER. Revised Edition by Joseph F.
Johnstone, Jr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974. Pp.
240. $22.95
SUMNER MARCUS*

Potential personal liability of corporate directors and officers has
increased substantially since 1961 when the original edition of this
book was published by the late Mortimer Feuer.1 This increased
exposure has been due in large measure to expansive applications
of the federal securities acts to directors and officers 2 and to the
increased availability of the federal class action pursuant to the
promulgation in 1966 of the revised rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 3 At the same time state legislatures have attempted during this period to allow corporations to insulate more
effectively their directors and officers from potential liability
through indemnification and insurance arrangements. 4
There also is a tendency for management of some publicly held
corporations to consider seriously how the corporate structure might
* A.B., M.B.A., J.D., Harvard University; Ph.D., University of Washington. Professor,
Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Washington.
1. M. FAuER, PEnSoNAL LIABnLxrIS OF CORPORATE OMOERS AND DmRcToRs (1961). The director's plight has beeh described as follows:
An individual director, of course, cannot be expected to be an expert in the

provisions of the Securities Acts, the [Securities and Exchange Commission]
regulations, the Antitrust laws, relevant state laws, legal and extralegal precedents involving direct and derivative types of liability, and the business itself
to boot. He must set himself a guideline that makes up in breadth what it may
lack in precision. For example, P -SE = Pm seems a good rule to follow-freely
translated, it says that inquiry times information times involvement without
self-enrichment leads to Peace of Mind. The difficulty is that such a formula
stops short of disclosing the depth of information and involvement expected of
the director today.
Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable than Ever, 51 HARv. Bus. Ray., Jan.-Feb. 1973,
at 108.
2. Among the most notable developments in this regard have been the decisions in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part and reu'd in part,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971), on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3. FAD. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. See, e.g., CAL. Comm. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
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be modified to enable outside directors to perform their duties more
knowledgeably and more independently. 5 Students of the corporation are beginning to recognize that the present methods of utilizing
outside directors deny management the benefits of the wisdom and
broader perspectives of such directors and that this deprivation is
prejudicial to the interests of both the corporation and the society
which has assigned such an important role to the corporation.5
These and other developments justified, indeed required, a revision of the Feuer work. The new edition is largely an updated version of the original; although Joseph F. Johnstone, Jr., has substantially rewritten several chapters and added new ones, there is no
alteration of the essential stiucture of the first edition. A review of
the Johnstone edition therefore must consider the merits and shortcomings of the earlier work as well as the treatment of developments
in public policy relating to officers and directors since 1961.
The first edition was addressed to "corporate executives" and
"lawyers who advised them" and was intended to answer questions
concerning directors' and officers' liabilities "which concern them
so directly and intimately."7 Its author emphasized, however, at the
outset: "It is not our purpose. . . even obliquely to suggest that the
corporate director or officer undertake to act as his own lawyer in
any given situation. . . [T]his book shall have served its purpose
if it conveys sufficient understanding of the corporate fiduciary concept in its varied applications to create an awareness of possible
pitfalls in action contemplated, and fosters, when the need arises,
appreciative acceptance of legal advice sought and offered."" This
statement of purpose is repeated almost verbatim in the new edition, but the disclaimer is reinforced by a "further word of caution,"
namely that the relevant law is "undergoing rapid development at
the present time, particularly in the area covered by the federal
securities laws" and that existing laws and proposed changes are
being reviewed by state legislatures, Congress, and private groups
such as the American Law Institute.' The significance of the cau5. See, e.g., Cabot, Actions for Individual Directors,Bus. & Soc'Y RLv., Winter 1974-75,

at 70; Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable than Ever, 51 HARv. Bus. Rav., Jan.-Feb.
1973, at 107.
6. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Colo. Ass'n of Corporate Counsel, Feb. 21, 1974, in
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,669, at 83,802-03.
7. M. FsuR, PERSONAL LIAmiras OF ConPoPAT OrcEns AND DmncroRs at vii (1961).
8. Id. at2.
9. M. FauE , PmisoNAL Lmmrris op CoRpRATE OFFICERS AnD DmEacroRs 11 (2d ed. J.
Johnstone 1974).

1040

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1038

tionary note is made clear: "These considerations make it all the
more important for directors and officers to consult their own counsel when problems arise."10
Accordingly, the first question must be whether it is possible to
compile meaningful information about the potential liabilities of a
director or officer which will not only assist him in decisionmaking,
but at the same time alert him to the occasions when he should seek
the advice of counsel. A second question concerns whether a book
that succeeds in such an effort also can be of value to the lawyer
whose advice may be sought. Whenever a lawyer seeks by means of
a text to instruct a layman about a field of the law of average or
above average complexity, he is likely to find himself steering a
tricky course between oversimplification and the preoccupation
with legal technicalities that is so characteristic of legal literature.
If he steers a reasonably successful course for the lay reader, he is
almost certain to be off course from the perspective of his legal
audience. This revision of the Feuer book has not wholly avoided
these hazards, but in many respects it does accomplish both tasks.
The organization of the book leads the lay reader logically through
the basic legal concepts that are significant for the corporate fiduciary. After first examining the duties which an individual owes a
corporation, its stockholders, and its creditors generally, the book's
structure then emphasizes specific areas of possible personal liability for the director or officer. These include executive compensation
agreements, the appropriation of corporate opportunities, competition with the corporation, dividend payments by the corporation,
charitable contributions by the corporation, transactions in the corporation's securities, and the illegal actions of other directors and
officers taken on behalf of the corporation. Not only does the book
explain the many ways in which officers and directors may be exposed to liability, it also suggests ways for them to protect themselves from liability. It discusses the potentialities and limitations
of indemnification arrangements, insurance, and education by corporate legal counsel as methods for reducing these liabilities. The
revised edition goes somewhat beyond the legal liabilities of directors and officers by discussing also their social responsibilities.
Most of the 20 relatively brief chapters of the book start with a
series of succinct statements concerning the topic of the chapter and
10. Id.
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its importance for the corporate officer and director. An often successful effort is made to explain the rationale for the applicable legal
principles in terms that should be understandable to the layman
without offending by their simplicity the legally trained reader.
Among the more successful chapters are those dealing with the use
of corporate funds in proxy contests, the application of the Securities Act of 193311 to securities distribution and trading, and stockholder derivative and class actions. These summarize at the outset
all the relevant matters which should be of principal concern to the
officer or director in planning his course of conduct and only later
introduce the more subtle issues that necessarily are of greater concern to the lawyer and that inay be omitted by the lay reader. The
chapter on conflicts of interest in both editions, however, is likely
to confuse the lay reader by introducing sophisticated legal concepts
without providing a sufficient explanation. Confusion is compounded because the chapter attempts to address all possible permutations of the laws of the 50 states without providing the reader
a ready means for finding the law of the state that most concerns
him.
The chapter dealing with rule 10b-512 and particularly with its
application in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation13 serves the desirable purpose of alerting the corporate officer or director to the dangers of both insider trading and participation in the issuance of
unintentionally false corporate statements. The effectiveness of this
chapter is diminished by a somewhat confusing mixture of analysis
of existing potential liability and public policy proposals designed
to reduce such liability in connection with securities transactions in
general. While the author is to be commended for advocating the
public policies that he believes will best serve the interests of corporations and their officers and directors, his readers, whatever their
expertise, would benefit more from a precise analysis of the law
existing when the book went to press and from a pocket supplement
to report subsequent developments."
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
13. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part and
rev'd inpart,401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, 312
F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
14. The need for some means of updating the book was apparent almost as soon as the book
appeared. The inability to include any reference to the final step taken by the Supreme Court
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Despite this criticism, it is only fair to state that even lawyers
may find the revised edition, with its emphasis upon the numerous
developments in the pertinent law since 1961, an excellent introduction to a dynamic subject. In this short, but comprehensive book,
one can become acquainted with the newly emerging responsibilities
of both the lawyer as director, and of his client as director, to the
extent that these duties have been sketched out thus far in the
leading decisions of federal and state courts.15 The task of revising
the original edition to reflect more recent decisions that significantly affect or alter the personal liability of corporate officers and
directors generally has been accomplished well, although Johnstone's limited perspective rendered less successful his attempts to
address the new aspects of social responsibility and to suggest methods for reducing exposure to liability.
His penultimate chapter is designed to deal with "the practical
measures that are available to protect directors and officers against
liability."1 6 Adequate treatment is given to the potentialities and
possible pitfalls in relation to indemnification and to directors' and
officers' liability insurance. Johnstone suggests how corporate counsel may help educate directors and officers as to their conduct under
the antitrust and other laws, and he emphasizes in light of Escott
v. BarChris Construction Corp.17 the importance of establishing a
record of "due diligence" to avoid liability in connection with inaccurate registration statements.1 8 One may ask, however, whether
Johnstone has placed the outside director sufficiently on notice of
the possibility that he may be held liable in the future for other
types of erroneous information disseminated in connection with the
sale of securities when the director has been negligent in ferreting
out the truth. 9 The fault goes beyond the question of whether Johnmars an otherwise excellent discussion of the class action issues raised in the Eisen litigation.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to dismiss appeal denied,
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968), on remand, 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 54 F.R.D.
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. M. FEUEa, supra note 9, at 204.
17. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
18. M. FEUER, supranote 9, at 213.
19. As SEC Commissioner Sommer has aptly pointed out, some members of the corporate
bar have tended to take too much comfort from the closely decided case of Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), and to assume that directors will be held responsible
only for the dissemination of information known to be erroneous or which was disseminated
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stone has evaluated legal trends adequately.
Regardless of the precise turns that may be taken in the next few
years by the law relating to personal liability of directors and officers, a socially responsible corporation and its outside directors
might wish to be certain that the directors are in a position to ensure
the quality of the management of the corporation through deliberate
appraisal of management's performance. As some experienced
directors have begun to note, 2 such an appraisal requires that the
directors are aware of management's goals, that they have the opportunity to review periodically these management objectives, and
that they have access to the information needed to evaluate management's success in attaining its goals. Successful reduction of the
potential personal liability of corporate directors involves more than
the liberalization of indemnification procedures and the purchase of
insurance; it is equally important that directors have a real opportunity to exercise the independent judgment for which they presumably have been selected.
In the last chapter, the author shifts his focus from actual and
potential legal liabilities to the social responsibilities of officers and
directors. Among these responsibilities according to both editions of
the book, is a need for managers of "very large" national and international corporations to consider often questions involving the
"'public interest" along with the corporation's economic advantage. 21 In the original edition Feuer felt no obligation to make more
than a passing reference to the concept of the social responsibility
of managers, an unsurprising conclusion since the literature of the
subject at that time had been characterized for the most part by an
abundance of rhetoric and a dearth of meaningful analysis.2 By the
time of the Johnstone revision, however, the literature of social responsibility was growing rapidly in both volume and analytical content. Johnstone's failure to expand the treatment of the subject
accordingly was one of the several challenges he failed to meet.
Throughout the book, there are abundant citations of cases and
some citations of books and articles for the various propositions
recklessly. Address by A.A. Sommer, supra note 6, at 83,804-06. His view has been at least
partially vindicated by the espousal of a "flexible duty standard" approach by another court
of appeals in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
20. See Cabot, supra note 5; Estes, supranote 5.
21. M. FEER, supranote 9, at 216, 217.
22. See Cheit, The New Place of Business: Why Managers Cultivate Social
Responsibility, in THE BusinEss ESTABLISHmENT 152, 158-61 (E. Cheit ed. 1964).
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stated. Although the citations are not exhaustive, they generally are
adequate to satisfy at least the needs of the lay reader. The author
also is careful to reflect significant differences of opinion concerning
many of the topics discussed. When he turns his attention to the
very complex subject of social responsibility, however, about which
opinions not only differ but are strongly held, the author chooses to
pontificate rather than to -acquaint the reader fully with the various
approaches in the literature. Even more serious is the failure to refer
the reader to additional sources which might help him resolve the
issues for himself.2
Like that of many other commentators on corporate social responsibility, the basic shortcoming of Johnstone's approach is that it is
confused and of little help operationally to corporate managers.
While stating that managers have "an ultimate responsibility" for
maintaining "our economic heritage" which "the fiduciary principle, and the laws of collective bargaining and fair trading, do not
begin to reach," he attacks "the new critics" who are "demanding
that corporations devote a substantial part of their energies and
resources to social goals which have nothing to do with making a
profit."' Having established this seemingly neat dichotomy of forprofit and not-for-profit activities, the author acknowledges corporate responsibility for product safety, environmental protection, and
"good citizenship,"' but asserts that this responsibility "does not
mean that corporate managers must undertake to cure all the nation's ills with the stockholders' money." 2 Sketching this nebulous
line between those socially responsible actions that are appropriate
and those that are not is of doubtful utility. This failure is a particularly unfortunate conclusion for a book the principal purpose of
which is to guide managers in carrying out their managerial function.
Nonetheless the book must be given good marks overall for the
23. The following illustrate the improved quality of this literature in recent years and
suggest the wide range of views regarding the subject: K. ANDREWS, THE CONCEPT Op CORPORATE STRATEGY 118-77 (1971); THE CORPORATE DLEhIA (D. Votaw & S. Sethi eds. 1973);
Blumberg, CorporateResponsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REv. 157 (1970); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969); Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate
Altruism, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 708 (1973).
24. M. FEUER, supra note 9, at 217.
25. Id. at 218.
26. Id.
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way in which it explicates the nature and magnitude of the legal
pitfalls confronting the corporate director or manager who attempts
to fulfill his duties to the corporation and to make personal decisions
in contiguous, perhaps conflicting, areas. Apart from the insights
that a reader, however well informed, may gain from a lucid exposition of fundamental principles, the lawyer will find this book
valuable as a framework for consultations with his client; he might
well consider having the client read it as a prelude to consultation
and to alert him to the increasing hazards awaiting the corporate
manager and particularly the outside director.

